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Article 7

The Origin of Humans
by
Helen Watt, Ph.D.

The author is Research Fellow, Linacre Centrejor Health Care Ethics, London.
It can be claimed that the human moral subject - the " human being" or
"human person" - is to be identified with something more or less familiar: the
living human organism. The aim of this paper is not to defend this claim, although
I think it can be defended. The aim is rather to establish what is required,
assuming this claim is accepted, for it to be the case that a human person - a
human organism - has come into existence. I will begin, however, with a brief
description of a theory on which the human person is the organism, before
seeking to establish what the organism is, and when it first comes into being.
What I will call the "organic" theory does not presuppose an addition , or
substitution, of which there is no sign. It does not presuppose that the living body
is joined by a separate soul or person. Rather than the embryo or fetus being
joined or replaced by such another entity, the embryo and fetus is the person at an
early stage of his or her existence. The same person - that is to say, the same
human animal - is first unable, then able to move, feel, think, and so on. These
are abilities acquired by the animal, not ascribable to some alternative entity. I
Such abilities are therefore not essential to our being here at all.
The organic theory confirms the intuition held by many that our human moral
status is inalienable. That is to say, there are no humans existing with some
inferior status, but every human has human moral status for as long as he or she
exists. We have objective interests in certain benefits - both short - and longer
- term - which are morally important between our conscious moments, and
before any such moment can occur. The result is not that all human beings - any
more than all adults - have the same set of rights, but is rather that all human
beings have their own (though overlapping) sets of rights, as moral subjects of
importance. As the entity which lives, grows and (eventually) thinks and talks,
the human organism is, prima jacie, the obvious candidate for human status. In
view of this, we should identify the organism as accurately as we can.
Potential and Human Fertilization
An organism - human or non-human - cannot be described without
reference to "potential": a term often used, though in widely differing senses, in
the context ofhuman reproduction. It should be noted that the potential m<N characteristic
36

Linacre Quarterly

of an organism is not a passive potential, of the kind a stick has to be split, or a cell
to be cloned. Rather, it is an active potential ofthat organism 2 to initiate changes
in itself in the appropriate environMent. Active potential refers to continuity
between not doing, and doing, on the part of an individual. It is with reference to
active potential that we distinguish the living from the dead, and living parts such
as skin cells (which have some active tendencies) from living wholes or organisms
(which have others). All living wholes have the active potential, which they
retain throughout their existence, to direct their own activities in ways relating to
their own well-being.
Fertilization, in the sense of sperm entry, is often singled out as the point of
departure for the life-cycle of a higher animal. However, this view has, of course,
been contested, in relation to humans in particular. During sperm entry, when the
sperm has passed within the zona pellucida enveloping the ovum, the sperm and
ovum membranes open to each other, and the inside of the sperm is released into
the cytoplasm of the ovum. 3 Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson and Peter Singer'"
among others, have argued that there is no " moment" of fertilization during the
process of sperm entry. The sperm, they say, remains identifiable even after
entering the cytoplasm. The genetic material in the head of the sperm remains
intact, forming the male pronucleus. Just as Siamese twins are two distinct
entities contained within one body, so, they say, the male pronucleus is distinct
from - although contained within - the ovum. The ovum before the lining-up
at syngamy of the male and female chromosomes is not, these writers claim,
genetically unified, however else it is unified.
Theories differ over whether human beings come into existence by degrees.
There are, of course, entities which do this: for example, aggregates, such as piles
of sand, and artifacts, such as cars. Living things, which are self-directing, are
more than aggregates of other things. And one of the differences between
organisms and artifacts is that while the latter are characterized with reference to
the end-product - that is, to the aims of the producer - the former are
characterized with reference to current active tendencies (which may relate to
longer-term developments) and corresponding internal goods. The presence or
absence of the defining tendencies of a being of this kind at this stage of
development is what makes such a being either present or absent. An organism is
a living whole, as opposed to a living part, and for this reason cannot come into
existence by degrees. With regard to syngamy, it is not easy to link the
appearance of such a living whole with any stage in the lining-up of
chromosomes present in the cell since the entry of the sperm.
The single-cell embryo has, before syngamy, and the previous disintegration of
the nuclear envelopes, not one but two genetic centers: the male and female
pronuclei. The co-ordinated activity of these genetic centers, within the one cell
membrane, prepares for later activity which must in any case be ascribed to the
organism itself. The male and female pronuclei work within one cell for common
ends; for the good of one organism. (In the case of Siamese twins, in contrast, two
brains - two centers of control - give directions of which many relate to parts
not shared by the twins: for example, their separate faces.) The formation and
acti vity of the two pronuclei , together with previous signs of
May, 1995
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activation, are indications that the cell is working as a living whole geared
towards further development.
Moreover, whether or not a living whole comes into being on completion of
sperm entry, it is not possible to claim that the sperm remains indentifiable on
completion of sperm entry. For during sperm entry, the sperm is broken up, not
simply enveloped by the ovum. The inside of the sperm, in entering the
cytoplasm, leaves the membrane behind to be absorbed in due course, as the
incorporated portion of the tail is absorbed, while the male pronucleus forms
from the nucleus of the sperm. The sperm cannot be identified with its contents.
Even should we want to deny that the contents of the sperm turn at once into
parts of a new living entity, we must acknowledge that the sperm has been
dismantled in delivering material to the ovum.
If sperm entry is regarded as involving at least the destruction of the sperm, we
should ask if we can identify a decisive point of discontinuity during the process
of sperm entry. I would place this at the point at which the inside of the sperm has
passed entirely into the cytoplasm of the ovum 5, and has separated entirely from
the membrane of the sperm, which remains embedded in what is now the
membrane of the zygote. We should follow our normal practice of singling out a
new (sub)entity when some part of the old is disconnected from its (sizeable)
neighbor, and is not now behaving as if it were the pre-existing entity. As for the
zygote, it is spatially more continous with the ovum than the inside of the sperm is
with the sperm. Discontinuity is, however, quite dramatically signalled in the
case of the zygote by the advent of developmental powers.
An Origin After Sperm Entry and Syngamy

Some writers, while admitting that the zygote is a separate individual from the
ovum, deny that the organism can be traced to the appearance of the zygote,
whenever this takes place. Norman Ford 6 , for example, has argued that a new
individual comes into existence at syngamy, but that this individual is not
continuous with the later human organism. The zygote, after all, splits into two: a
process which it cannot survive. Then again, can we see as an individual the
dividing group of cells within the zona pellucida? And can we claim that the
group of cells is continuous with the body of, say, the 14-day embryo, if sites are
not yet marked out for parts of this body, and if cells are not yet differentiated,
and can be used to form any part of the "embryo proper", the accessory tissues
(the umbilical cord, the placenta) or can indeed be separated off to form new
embryos, or combined with other cells to form chimeras?
With regard to Ford's claim that first cell division marks a break in continuity,
it can be objected that the cells resulting from division are neither spatially nor
functionally separate, but rather work as parts of one whole, pressed together
within a single zona pellucida. 71t is by reference to functional unity that normal
mitotic division can be contrasted with early twinning, giving rise to two
independent organisms, still within one zona pellucida. 8 In the case of a single
embryo not only is there co-operation between constituent cells of the organism 9,
but developments such as cell differentiation are only possible because the cells of
the early embryo act in such a way as to give rise to these developments.
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"Totipotency" of cells is, in fact , a precondition of later differentiation, which
does not arise accidentally, but is prepared for by the activity ofthe early embryo.
To Ford's further point that parts of the eai-Iy embryo are not spatiotemporally
continuous with corresponding parts of the later organism 10, it can be objected
that parts are continuous with those which immediately precede them, so that the
later whole is continuous with all stages of the earlier whole. The change in form
should not be seen as decisive; elsewhere in biology we are prepared to
countenance significant variations both of bulk and of form under the relevant
covering concept. II Such tissues as the placenta should be included in the later
whole into which the earlier whole develops, since these tissues, like the milk
teeth after birth, are a temporary body part of immature humans. The placenta
can, of course, be shared by twins - as other organs can be shared by Siamese
twins. The placenta can be genetically different from the rest of the embryo - as
can other parts of the embryo.12 The fact that many cells of the early embryo will
give rise to so-called "extra-embryonic" tissues is evidence for , not against, the
continuous existence of an organism which first grows and then discards what is
needed for a phase of its development. 13
With regard to the point that totipotent cells can be separated off to form new
embryos or chimeras, it can be argued that the fact that a part of a whole might
contribute material to another whole does not mean that this part is not now a
genuine part of the original whole. If an ovum is a part of a woman before
contributing material to an embryo, something similar can be said about an
embryonic cell which may be isolated and activated in some new direction. If
such a cell were activated so as to give rise to (rather than contribute to) an
embryo, the tendency after activation to develop as a separate individual could be
seen as indicating a substantial change from the cell to the embryo. The earlier
passive potential of the cell to be isolated by outside intervention does not mean
that the embryo it comes from has the active potential to produce a new embryo,
much less to be a new embryo. The mere possibility of twinning or combining
does not suffice to show that the embryo is not a human organism: that is to say,
an entity with human self-directive tendencies, or (as some describe it) a human
"life-principle", or soul. 14

Twinning Tendencies and Twinning Propensities
Where twinning casts more serious doubt on the previous existence of a
human organism is where there seems to be an inherent tendency - or, at least,
an inherent propensity - to symmetric twinning. If the early embryo is defined
by tendencies which include the tendency to form some later type of body, then
what are we to say ifthere are embryos with the tendency to form not one but two
of this type of body? Twinning may occur so early that any potential, for
example, to differentiate cells along a certain pattern will be carried out by two
and not by one. We may be unable to identify the original individual with one
twin rather than its sibling. Are we, then, to suppose that this individual dies in
giving rise to two descendants?
For the zygote which does not twin, first cell-division does not involve
May, 1995
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disintegration of the zygote. Rather, a constituent cell produces new constituent
cells, working in the interests of the whole. In contrast there is evidence of
twinning if two segmentation cavities appear within the zona pellucida, or if at
some later stage there are two inner cell masses, two amniotic cavities or two
embryonic discs. It should be noted that monozygotic twins may develop within
a single zona, and then together in one blastocyst - as indeed non-identical,
dizygotic twins may sometimes develop within a single zona, and then together in
one blastocyst, after the dispermic fertilization of two cells resulting from division
of an unfertilized ovum. 15
Where there is evidence of symmetric twinning, it would appear that the
dividing individual has ceased to exist, giving rise to two physically distinct
(though perhaps adjacent) organisms. In such a case there is radical disruption of
the original organism, such that neither resulting individual can be
spatiotemporally continuous with that original organism. If, on the other hand,
one cell is removed by a scientist from a multi-cell embryo, as in embryo biopsy,
it would appear that a new entity has been generated - an embryo or not,
depending on its tendencies - without sufficient disruption to entail the death of
the original embryo. In the same way, if an adult cell of mine could be cloned to
produce another person, this would not mean that in losing this part of my body I
ceased to exist, nor that prior to cloning I was more than one person. The case of
symmetric twinning can be compared, in contrast, to a case in which I am split
into all my component cells, each one of which is then cloned. 16 Clearly, in such a
case I cease to exist as an organism: an individual living whole. My remains, like
those of the dividing embryo, do not constitute a normal corpse, but the bodies of
my living descendants.
Ford suggests at one point that all zygotes have the "natural active potential" to
twin. 17 However, this does not appear to be the case; if it were, all zygotes would
eventually make themselves twin, unless deprived of the appropriate
environment. The fact that all zygotes could be made to twin (for example, by
researchers) does not show that all zygotes have an active tendency to twin. Even
in the case of an atypical conceptus, we should be careful not to misidentify an
active tendency to twin. IS For example, we can imagine an embryo, or apparent
embryo, with some acquired or inherent weakness such that in some
environments it would be made to twin, while in others it would not. A mere
inherent susceptibility to environmental pressures is not enough to constitute an
active tendency - though if there is no environment in which "development"
could take place after a certain point without being interrupted by twinning, then
the entity certainly lacks the tendency, which may be decisive, to produce a single
line of development after that point. If, on the other hand, it were known (as it is
not) that symmetric l9 twinning in certain rare cases were part of some internal
program l~ then we might have to postulate the existence in such cases not of a
real human organism or person but of - to use a term of Warren Quinn's21 - a
" proto-organism". Such an entity would survive until such time as the program
were carried out, or alternatively, until such time as the program, having been
thwarted, could no longer be carried out, at which point the advent of
developmental tendencies would signify the advent of a genuine human
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organism. The program to twin would in some sense give rise to the program of
the embryo to develop; however, these programs would be different enough to
mark their bearers off as different things. If an embryo is defined by its active
tendency to produce its own development, it would be wrong to call anything an
embryo which tended rather to produce its own early destruction.
Just as an embryo might arise from what was not an embryo, developmental
tendencies can be absent in an entity arising from an embryo. We can imagine a
situation in which an embryo was subjected to some outside intervention, so that
the resulting entity was placed on the point of twinning, which it would do
without further intervention. If the entity were unable to develop, not just in its
actual environment, but in any environment, then this would not be a living
human embryo, but the remains of an embryo. Adult humans, of course, remain
alive and human at times when they have only very short-term active tendencies:
that is, when their imminent death is guaranteed by their physical condition.
However, the organizational tendencies which characterize very immature
human beings include their developmental tendencies: the tendencies which link
their current stage of life to every later stage, and which they cannot lose and
survive.
The implications for identity of any active tendency to twin in what appeared
to be an embryo would depend on what active tendency, to produce what form
of activity, is required for the presence of an early human. We will return to this
question shortly. In the meantime, we should note the suggestion sometimes
made that if an embryo has the tendency to twin then it consists in reality of two
individuals, temporarily occupying the same space.22 The dualist implications of
this view are surely sufficient to exclude it. For since the same piece of space-time
would be "occupied" by each person, the two would originally be physically
indistinguishable. We would have to imagine two life-principles which somehow
animate one body in unison, before moving on to animate two separate bodies,
when these are eventually produced. Nor is it possible to claim that twins
resulting from one zygote share one initial history - as opposed to one
precondition of their coming into being. For this would be a violation of the
transitivity of identity: the twins, not identical with each other, cannot both be
identical with something else. 23 Different problems would arise if twins were
present "together" from the outset, but separate development could somehow be
prevented until a stage at which it was no longer possible. In this case, we would
have to say either that one or other twin had died - without there being any
physical basis for the death of one rather than the other - or worse, that both
twins were present as before, although they would never be physically
distinguishable.
If a human is an organism each human must be a separate self-directing entity.
The presence of a single set of twinning directions (or twinning propensities) in
the conceptus would not be enough to indicate the presence at that point of two
separate foci of control. Rather, it would indicate the presence of an active
tendency (or passive liability) on the part of that conceptus. For evidence of the
presence of two individuals we will need to find evidence, as in the case of
Siamese twins, of separate physical activities directed by separate foci of control.
May, 1995
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The phenomenon of identical twinning indicates that it is not, as is sometimes
claimed, the genome itself which is the unique, essential constituent of the person.
Nor can this even be said of an instance of a genome; say, that of one of a pair of
identical twins. For it is counterintuitive that any alteration to the genome - any
more than to some other part of the body - would bring about the destruction of
the original individual, and the generation of a new one. Even a major alteration
to the genome would not entail the destruction of the original individual if there
were present after the alteration a living being who retained the relevant human
tendencies.

Human Offspring and Human Products
What would be a genetic aberration of a kind incompatible with the existence
of a human? For clearly, we must distinguish between human offspring, and
what are no more than human products. Examples of the latter are complete
hydatiform moles, formed with no maternal genetic contribution and producing
extraembryonic tissue; and teratomas, which can produce a jumble of
disorganized tissues (teeth, skin, etc).24 Both these entities are genetically unique
and, in a sense, alive and human. Neither, however, is human offspring. Why is
this?
Some would say that what they lack is rational potential; that is, in the context
of early development, the tendency to organize themselves in such a way as to
develop rational abilities. In other words, if one precursor of rationality, such as
the fetal or infant brain, can be said to suffice for personhood, then an earlier
precurso r in the embryo can equall y be said to suffice. 25 The no rmal embryo.
fetus and infant has, at every stage, the acti ve tendency to develop rational
abilities. when appropriately cared fo r. Is this tendency essential to - or merely
typical of - the immature hum an organism?
As yet it is not clear what causes anencephaly: the condition due to which
infants are born with a working brainstem but with a badly disorganized upper
brain. It has been claimed that rather than anencephaly resulting from a failure in
neural tube formation , it may result, at least sometimes, from degeneration of a
previously normal neural tube.26 Should this be so, it would not alter the fact that
anencephalies are born without an active tendency to develop rational abilities,
whether or not they once had the epigenetic primordia of a healthy human brain.
In view of this fact, should we regard anencephalies, despite the features which
they share with normal infants, as human products, like hydatiform moles?
To return for a moment to the hydatiform mole, it is clear that such an entity
can be no more a human being than can a culture of skin cells. One indication of
this is that it seems odd to say that a hydatiform mole, any more than a culture of
skin cells, ought to have, by any stage, a healthy human brain. A hydatiform
mole, as a normal hydatiform mole, could not be expected to have any such
thing. In contrast, the anencephalic baby, though sharing its features with other
such babies, is not a normal, or healthy baby. We have some idea of what the
anencephalic is missing; we are able to say what tendencies ought to be there, and
are not. Moreover, we are able to say what tendencies ought to be there by
referring to tendencies which are there. A severely damaged infant (or fetus or
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embryo) will nonetheless have tendencies relating to the organization of many
features shared by other species members.
Moreover, such an infant will have some, though not all, of the tendencies it
needs to develop to maturity. For example, an anencephalic infant has some,
though not all, of the tendencies it needs to develop adult features. The active
tendencies it has by virtue of some of its parts cannot form part of a wider active
tendency to develop adult features, in view of the fact that these active
"subtendencies" are frustrated by defects in other parts - for example, by defects
in the control of the cardiovascular and respiratory systems. Not only is the adult
stage appropriate to the kind to which the infant belongs, but the infant has parts
by virtue of which it has active tendencies which would have helped it reach that
stage, were it not for other parts which are blocking or frustrating the action of the
first. We should distinguish between the active tendency of all humans first to
develop, and always to integrate their parts; missing "wider" tendencies due to
one sub-tendency being frustrated through lack of another; and absent tendencies
where there is and should be no such active sub-tendency. For example,a normal
male, unlike an infertile woman, has neither the tendency to give birth to a child
nor any of the specialized sub-tendencies (for example, to produce the relevant
hormones) which make up this wider tendency.
What, then, are the tendencies essential to the existence of a human being? I
have been assuming that the organizational tendencies essential to the existence
of an early human being include the tendency it has to organize its own
development. The active tendency to differentiate cells is at least a necessary
condition for early human life. Mere cell multiplication, without a view to later
differentiation, would not be human development. If, on the other hand, cells will
be differentiated to form a head, trunk, and so on, arranged as parts of one body,
then the conceptus would appear to be a human, at an early point in its
developmental path. In a case of doubt after some harmful intervention - for
example, the introduction of non-human cells - we should decide by reference
to the part of the mature human organism which we would take as sufficient
evidence of human organization. Those who would accept as sufficient evidence
the presence of a working human brain might then conclude that an active
tendency to produce a working human brain would be sufficient to show that the
conceptus was a human. If a working part of the brain - for example, the
brainstem - is thought to be sufficient in the case of older human beings, then a
tendency to form this working part might be taken to show that a conceptus was
an early human being.
The active tendency to differentiate cells in an orderly fashion and then to form
a working human brain, is, I would argue, sufficient indication of the presence of
an early human being: a living organism which directs itself in characteristic
human ways. Not only is the human brain the organic "control centre" of the
mature human organism, but the presence of a human brain, or the tendency to
produce one, is evidence that the organism is the kind of being which ought, by a
certain stage, to have rational abilities. A being with a human brain, or the
tendency to produce one, is a rational kind of being. It is a rational kind of being,
in one sense or another, whether or not it is the case - if the human "life-principle"
May, 1995
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is something subsistent 27 - that such a being has a non-material basis for many if
not all the tendencies required for rational behavior.
The profoundly mentally handicapped can only be described as such because
they are members of our kind. We believe we have duties to enable, or at very
least, to permit those not currently rational to attain what we see as their rational
fulfillment. If we cannot do this, our respect and sympathy - a response
appropriate to damaged members of our kind - can be shown in other ways.
The moral and biological class of human beings, which includes normal and
damaged, mature and immature, is the class not of those with current rational
abilities, nor even of those with "wider" rational tendencies, but of those whose
active tendencies constitute them members of our rational kind.28

Conclusion
Various areas have been touched on in this paper, without their being given the
attention they deserve. One final question should however, be raised before
concluding, which concerns the grounds for the widespread reluctance, even on
the part of those who think that we are organisms, to accept the embryo's claim to
be a human organism, and a human being, or person. If we lea ve aside emotional
pressures which implications of this claim may well create 29 , the most likely cause
of our reluctance is arguably the sheer unfamiliarity of at least the early embryo.
Very little was known about the embryo in previous generations, and even now,
many of us find our first sight ofthe embryo puzzling, or even alarming. How is it
possible, we may ask ourselves, that an entity which looks so unfamiliar is one of
us - a human being?
Arguments from the "inhuman" appearance of the embryo need to justify their
central assumption that this is not what human beings look like, at one stage of
their lives. 30 We do, of course, begin the enquiry into our origin with a mental
picture of the paradigmatic human person: someone with eyes, face, limbs, and so
on; someone of adult form and appearance. Our enquiry should not focus on
such features, which are not obviously essential, but should rather focus on what
persisting entity might underlie these and other features. Biological entities, such
as we are, are defined not by static but by selj-adaptingstructures and tendencies.
And while it is true that we trace a human being through time by identifying one
stage as similar to the next, we should not expect to find greater similarities
between disparate stages in the case of human beings than we find in the case of
other animals.
It may be objected that a familiar appearance is part of our social reality: part
of what we normally relate to in relating to a human being or person. It is
undoubtedly the case that we find it easier to relate to those who look like the
human beings to whom we are accustomed. However, we should not refuse to
recognize what we have reason to believe is a stage of human life, simply on the
grounds of unfamiliar appearance, or lack of emotional appeal. After all, a child
or adult of normal appearance may have much wider emotional appeal than does
a child or adult with a serious disfigurement. Nonetheless, those with serious
disfigurements do not have lower status than those without; they merely find it
harder to have their status recognized by other human beings. The interests of
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such people in their possible fulfillment, and the rights they have relating to those
interests, do not depend on these interests and rights being recognized by anyone
at all.
This paper has taken as its premise the organic theory of the person. Whether
this theory is accepted or rejected, it must be remembered that one of its features
is the proposition that a human being has objective interests which are morally
significant. If, as some claim 31 , there are objective "human goods" - objective
modes of human flourishing - our interests will not depend on our taking an
interest in the goods we may enjoy. A human being will not need to develop this
or that level of mental or physical ability for his or her fulfillment to have moral
significance. What is essential will not be the actual possession of such features as
rationality, but the existence of a being who would be fulfilled in acquiring such
features. Clearly, our origin as living beings is significant on this view of persons,
for later abilities will not create, but fulfill, the living person who acquires them.
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